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Motivated by the structure of WTO negotiations, we analyze a bargaining environment in which
negotiations proceed bilaterally and sequentially under the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle.
We identify backward-stealing and forward-manipulation problems that arise when governments
bargain under the MFN principle in a sequential fashion. We show that these problems impede
governments from achieving the multilateral efficiency frontier unless further rules of negotiation
are imposed. We identify the WTO nullification-or-impairment and renegotiation provisions and its
reciprocity norm as rules that are capable of providing solutions to these problems. In this way, we
suggest that WTO rules can facilitate the negotiation of efficient multilateral trade agreements in a
world in which the addition of new and economically significant countries to the world trading
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rstaiger@wisc.edu1The League of Nations report describes the reasons for this failure: “...trade was consistently regarded as a form
of warfare, as a vast game of beggar-my-neighbour, rather than as a co-operative activity from the extension of which
all stood to benefit.  The latter was the premise on which the post-war conferences based their recommendations – a
premise accepted by all in theory but repudiated by almost all in practice.  It was repudiated in practice because, as the
issue presented itself on one occasion after another, it seemed only too evident that a Government that did not use its
bargaining power would always come off second-best.”  (League of Nations, 1942, p. 120).    
2The WTO does grant certain exceptions to MFN, for example to allow the formation of free trade agreements
and customs unions.  We abstract from these exceptions here.  We also take as given the MFN clause, and do not offer
here an explanation for its usefulness.  For formal analyses of the role of the MFN clause in trade agreements, see
Bagwell and Staiger (1999a, 1999b, forthcoming), Caplin and Krishna (1991), Choi (1995), Ethier (1998), Ludema
(1991) and McCalman (1997).  For a comprehensive survey, see Horn and Mavroidis (2000).
3This feature is noted, for example, by Horn and Mavroidis (2000), who observe: “...In the WTO, negotiations
for the most part take place between subsets of Member countries.  Sometimes this is ‘officially sanctioned,’ as in the
case of Principal Supplier negotiations.  But also in seemingly multilateral negotiations, the ‘actual’ negotiations occur
between a very limited number of countries...” (Horn and Mavroidis, 2000, p. 34).
1
I.  Introduction
Under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO) – and GATT, its predecessor
organization created in 1947 – governments have met with remarkable success in liberalizing world
trade.  This success, however, was not immediate, and history suggests that it was not a forgone
conclusion.  The inter-war years witnessed numerous international conferences, convened to
orchestrate a return to the liberal trade policies of the pre-war period.  These conferences consisted
largely of expressions of support for liberal trading ideals, and invariably they ended in failure
(Hudec, 1990, pp. 3-45, and League of Nations, 1942, pp. 101- 155).
1  The creation of GATT
marked a fundamental divergence from these earlier efforts.  In effect, GATT provided  a negotiating
forum organized around market access interests, wherein the original 23 member-governments could
seek to “buy” access rights to the markets of their trading partners and “sell” access to their own
markets.  This forum spawned a more-or-less continuous process of negotiations extending over 50
some years and now involving more than 140 countries.
The success of the GATT/WTO is all the more remarkable in light of three prominent
features of the GATT/WTO negotiating environment.  First, WTO negotiations must abide by the
most favored nation (MFN) principle.  Under this principle, a WTO-member country must provide
all member-countries with the same conditions of access to its markets.
2  Second, WTO negotiations
take place overwhelmingly among small numbers of countries.
3  And third, as observed above,2
GATT/WTO negotiations have extended over half a century, during which time the addition of new
and economically significant countries to the world trading system – via either the process of
economic development or the act of accession to the GATT/WTO – has occurred on a continuing
basis.  Each new arrival marks in turn both a potential new buyer of market access and a potential
new seller of market access.   As a consequence of these three features, it is routine for a country to
engage in market access negotiations on a product with one country, having previously negotiated
tariff commitments on that product with another country, all subject to MFN. 
In this sequential MFN negotiating environment, a pair of potential impediments to
multilateral efficiency may be identified.  First, under MFN, any market access concession that a
country makes to an early negotiating partner is automatically available to future negotiating partners
as well.  To reduce the associated potential for “free-riding,” a country might then engage in
inefficient “foot-dragging,” offering little in the way of trade liberalization to early negotiating
partners, in order to maintain its bargaining position for later negotiations.  A second impediment
to multilateral efficiency might arise if later negotiating partners themselves engage in “bilateral
opportunism,” whereby these negotiating partners seek to alter the market access implications of
earlier negotiations to their own advantage.  More broadly, we may associate the first impediment
with a forward-manipulation problem, in which early agreements are manipulated to alter the
outcome of later negotiations, and the second impediment with a backward-stealing problem, in
which later agreements are structured to take surplus from earlier negotiating partners. 
Does the GATT/WTO owe its success to the fact that these potential impediments  are simply
unimportant?  Or can its rules instead be credited with providing governments with  some assurance
that forward-manipulation and backward-stealing problems will not become severe?  In this paper,
we suggest that the potential impediments to efficiency created by these problems are important.
And we identify GATT/WTO rules that can help governments overcome these impediments.
Our analysis is carried out within a three-country two-good world, in which a home-country
government negotiates bilaterally and sequentially with each of two trading partners, subject to the4For example, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights negotiated in the
Uruguay Round is often interpreted as a transfer from the developing world to industrialized countries that was granted
in exchange for certain market access concessions (such as the phase-out of the Multifiber Arrangement). 
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MFN principle.  We also permit governments to make direct international transfers as part of their
bilateral negotiations.  We do this for two reasons.  The first reason is to ensure analytical
tractability: the feasibility of direct international transfers simplifies our analysis considerably.  The
second reason is to endow governments with a reasonably flexible portfolio of policy instruments.
While actual trade negotiations rarely if ever involve explicit transfers as part of the agreement, these
negotiations do often involve more than just tariff reductions.
4  Our assumption that direct
international transfers are feasible may be seen as an attempt to capture these additional policy
dimensions in a simple model, with “reality” positioned somewhere in between the extremes of
negotiations over tariffs only and negotiations over tariffs and direct international transfers.    
Within this framework, we characterize the multilateral efficiency frontier, and we then
explore whether this frontier can be reached in subgame-perfect equilibria of specific bargaining
games that entail sequential and bilateral negotiations under MFN.  We explore this issue in two
broad steps.  We first show that, in our basic sequential MFN bargaining game, the backward-
stealing problem makes it impossible for governments to reach the multilateral efficiency frontier:
beginning from any efficient combination of tariffs and transfers, the home government and its later
negotiating partner can always alter the tariffs and transfers under their control in a way that benefits
them at the expense of the (unrepresented) early negotiating partner.  When we impose an exogenous
“security requirement” that later agreements may not involve backward stealing, we find that the
forward manipulation problem makes it generally impossible for governments to reach the efficiency
frontier: as a general matter, the home government can engage in inefficient foot-dragging with its
early negotiating partner by keeping its tariff high, and both the home government and its early
negotiating partner can thereby benefit at the expense of the (unrepresented) later negotiating partner,
who is stuck with a less-favorable disagreement point. 
With the backward stealing and forward manipulation problems identified in our basic5 For other important formulations, see Hart and Tirole (1990), O’Brien and Shaffer (1992) and Segal (1999).
We describe the findings under sequential contracting, but similar themes also appear under simultaneous contracting.
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sequential MFN bargaining game, we then turn to the second broad step of our analysis.  We
demonstrate that renegotiation opportunities such as those provided in the GATT/WTO can curtail
the significance of early negotiation outcomes for the disagreement payoffs of subsequent
negotiating partners, and thereby alleviate the inefficiency associated with forward manipulation.
And we show that the GATT/WTO reciprocity norm and nullification-or-impairment provisions can
mimic a security requirement, and thereby can be seen as helping to alleviate the backward stealing
problem.  Our main finding is then that the GATT/WTO rules analyzed in this second step permit
governments engaged in sequential MFN bargaining to achieve efficient outcomes that are otherwise
precluded by the backward stealing and forward manipulation problems identified in step one. 
Our paper is directly related to earlier work in both Industrial Organization and in
International Trade.  In the Industrial Organization literature on contracting with externalities, our
paper has links to both the common-seller models and the common-buyer models.   
In a common-seller model, a single seller offers an input and sequentially contracts with two
buyers. The buyers interact directly, through their subsequent product-market conduct. In the
formulation that McAfee and Schwartz (1994) present, the seller makes take-it-or-leave-it offers,
where an offer is comprised of a wholesale price and a fixed fee.
5  The buyers’ product-market
choices are non-contractible. Once the first buyer has sunk the fixed fee, the seller has possible
incentive to offer the second buyer a lower wholesale price in exchange for a higher fixed fee. The
wholesale-price reduction gives the second buyer an advantage in the product market, and the seller
and the second buyer are thus tempted to “steal backwards” from the first buyer. McAfee and
Schwartz provide findings suggesting that a non-discrimination clause is ineffective in curbing such
opportunism, where such a clause ensures that any wholesale-price/fixed-fee pairing that is offered
to the second buyer is also offered to the first buyer. Marx and Shaffer (2000a) show, however, that
non-discrimination clauses in fact do enable efficient outcomes to be achieved in equilibrium.5
We may think of our model as a common-seller model, in which the seller (country A) offers
wholesale prices (tariffs) to the buyers (countries B and C) in exchange for fixed fees (transfers),
where the buyers also make product-market (tariff) choices. Our model, however, introduces four
key differences. First, we do not assume that payoffs are quasi-linear; consequently, efficiency
imposes direct restrictions on the selection of transfers. Second, the contracts that we study only
establish upper bounds on subsequent (non-fee) choices, in accord with GATT/WTO tariff
commitments.  Third, motivated by the trade-policy application, the non-discrimination clause that
we consider ensures only that the seller offers a uniform wholesale price to both buyers. The buyers
may pay different fixed fees. Fourth, the buyers' product-market choices are contractible in our
model, and in fact the first buyer’s product-market choice is fixed when the second negotiation
commences. In our model, therefore, the first buyer is especially vulnerable: the non-discrimination
clause is incomplete, the seller and second buyer negotiate over a larger range of payoff-relevant
variables and the conduct of the first buyer cannot be adjusted in response to the second contract. In
fact, we find that the backward-stealing problem is so severe that sequential contracting cannot
deliver efficiency, even when the non-discrimination clause is in place.
Our work is also related to the common-buyer model, in which two sellers sequentially
contract with the same buyer.  In the initial formulation, given by Aghion and Bolton (1987), sellers
make take-it-or-leave-it offers, and the buyer seeks only one unit and thus trades with just one seller.
The sellers interact only indirectly, through their contracts with the common buyer.  The first seller
offers a contract that specifies a penalty payment if the buyer transacts with the second.  This
contract alters the reservation value that the buyer holds when the second seller approaches and
thereby serves to manipulate the offer that the second seller makes. Indeed, when information is
symmetric, the efficient seller supplies the good, and the buyer and first seller extract all of the
surplus. Marx and Shaffer (2000b) generalize the common-buyer model and allow that the buyer
may trade with both sellers.  The buyer and first seller extract surplus (but not necessarily all surplus)
by manipulating the buyer’s future disagreement payoff, and their optimal efforts in this regard do6For other important extensions of the Aghion-Bolton (1987) model, see Marx and Shaffer (1999, 2001) and




We may think of our model as a generalized common-buyer model, such as Marx and Shaffer
(2000b) consider, in which the buyer (country A) offers fixed fees (transfers) to the sellers (countries
B and C) in exchange for their production (tariffs). But our model introduces several new elements:
the buyer makes a further choice (country A’s tariff) that directly affects both sellers, contracts
establish only upper bounds on subsequent (non-fee) choices, the sellers interact directly in that each
seller’s production affects the payoff of the other seller even when transfers are held fixed, the
transfer to the first seller cannot be conditioned upon the production of the second seller, and payoffs
are not quasi-linear and so efficiency also impinges on the selection of transfers. Our findings also
differ in important respects. First, early negotiators in our trade-policy game manipulate the
disagreement payoff of country C (i.e., the second seller). Second, in our model, the pursuit of rents
through forward manipulation creates an inefficiency (absent further rules). 
In the International Trade literature, we are aware of three papers that are closely related to
the present analysis. A first paper is Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming).  In that paper, we are also
concerned with the possibility of inefficient negotiating outcomes when pairs of countries can
negotiate bilaterally.  But there are two important differences between that paper and the present
analysis.  First, in our earlier paper we identify rules of negotiation that serve to protect the welfare
of governments that are not participating in a bilateral negotiation, and we relate these rules to WTO
principles, but we do not ask the central question of the present analysis: starting from an inefficient
(non-cooperative) set of policies, can a simple set of rules be identified which (i) allow governments
who engage in sequential bilateral MFN negotiations to arrive at an efficient arrangement, and (ii)
have a counterpart in GATT articles?  Providing an answer to this question requires a model of the
sequential bargaining process, something that our earlier paper does not provide.  A second
important difference is that we do not permit direct international transfers in our earlier paper.  We
indicate below how the possibility of international transfers affects our earlier results. 7
A second related paper in the International Trade literature is Limao (2002), who explores
an idea related to our foot-dragging result.  He shows that a government may engage in foot-dragging
under MFN to enhance its bargaining position with regard to a subsequent negotiating partner.
However, in Limao’s model, foot-dragging arises in anticipation of a subsequent preferential
agreement with non-trade objectives, while in our model foot-dragging arises in anticipation of
subsequent MFN market access negotiations.  A third related paper is Bond, Ching and Lai (2000).
Their paper, which focuses specifically on the process of accession under WTO rules, models this
process as one in which existing members first negotiate their MFN tariffs (and transfers) together,
and then as a group negotiate with the acceding member over the terms that MFN tariff treatment
will be extended to it.  Within this negotiating environment, Bond, Ching and Lai study how WTO
rules can affect the distribution of payoffs between existing WTO members and new members that
are negotiating to join the agreement.  But in contrast to the negotiating process we study below, in
their bargaining model there is no stage at which a country that had previously negotiated a tariff
agreement is absent from the bargaining table.  It is this feature of negotiations that gives rise to the
potential for bargaining inefficiencies in our model, and it is these inefficiencies and the WTO rules
which may be interpreted as preventing them that are our primary concern. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  The three-country two-good model is introduced
in section 2, where the efficiency frontier is also characterized. Section 3 introduces the basic
sequential MFN bargaining game, and identifies the backward-stealing problem, while section 4
identifies the forward-manipulation problem.  Sections 5 and 6 introduce renegotiation opportunities
and nullification-or-impairment/reciprocity provisions as a means by which to alleviate the forward
manipulation and backward stealing problems, respectively.  Section 7 concludes.  Proofs of all
lemmas and propositions not established in the text are collected in an Appendix.
2. The Model
2.1 The Basic Setup
We consider a perfectly competitive general equilibrium environment.  We assume that
country A exports good y to countries B and C in exchange for imports of good x from B and C.7In this 2-good MFN environment, countries B and C have no basis for trade between them.  
8This is a strong assumption, and so we emphasize that while it significantly simplifies our analysis, it is not
critical for our results.
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Country A may levy an MFN import tariff  , while countries B and C may each levy their own
import tariff,   and  , respectively.
7  We adopt the convention that  represents one plus the ad
valorem import tariff of country j, and we let   denote the vector of tariffs  .  Country A
may also make direct (consumption) transfers to country B and/or country C.  We denote the
(positive or negative) transfer from A to B by   and from A to C by  , measured in units of good
y.  The total net transfers made from A to its trading partners is then  , and we let   denote
the vector of transfers  . 
Provided that country A’s (MFN) tariff does not prohibit trade with either of its trading
partners B and C, there will be a common exporter price for good x in countries B and C, and we
denote this price by  .  The export price for good y in country A is denoted by  .  We may
define the ratio of  “world” prices (relative exporter prices) as  .  We refer to   as the
world price or the terms of trade between country A and its trading partners B and C.  Similarly, we
let   denote the price of good x relative to the price of good y prevailing locally in country
.  We refer to   as the ratio of local prices in country j.  With non-prohibitive tariffs,
international arbitrage links world and local prices:
;      for   .
We assume that the international transfers have no secondary burden or blessing (i.e., that they do
not affect the equilibrium terms of trade).
8  In each country, the sum of net transfers and tariff
revenue is distributed to consumers in a lump-sum fashion.
For any world price, each country’s trade must balance in light of its net transfers:
(1)
,9
where   and   for    denote, respectively, imports and exports for country j.  We
assume that transfers are never so large as to cause a country to export or import both goods (i.e., we
do not allow a country’s transfer to be larger than its trade in good y).  Market clearing determines
the equilibrium world price as a function of the vector of tariffs  .  With    denoting the
equilibrium terms of trade, the x-market clearing condition is given by:
(2) ,
where we now express imports and exports as explicit functions of local and world prices and
transfer levels. The y-market is assured to clear at   by (1)-(2).  We assume that the Marshall-
Lerner stability conditions are met globally (ensuring a unique   given  ), so that an inward shift
of a country’s import demand curve improves its terms-of-trade, and that the Lerner and Metzler
paradoxes are ruled out, so that  ,  ,    and  for  .
With   held fixed, a change in   or   can affect   only through the effect on A’s
national income.  But the income effect of a small change in  , measured in units of good y, is
given by the import volume  .  With analogous observations for B and C, we thus impose the
following structure on each country’s trade function (subscripts denote partial derivatives):
(2a) ; ; and .  
Finally, we represent the objectives of each government as a general function of its local
prices, its terms of trade, and the net transfers it grants or receives.  In particular, we represent the
welfare of the government of country j by   for  .   We place the
following basic restrictions on these objective functions.  First, under analogous reasoning to that
which leads to (2a), we impose the following structure on each country’s objective function:
(3) ; ; and .  
As before, this structure reflects the link between direct international transfers and the income effects
of changes in  .  And second, we assume that, holding its local prices and its terms of trade fixed,
each government would prefer an increase in net transfers toward it:   .  Under
(3), this implies as well that, holding its local prices and its net transfer fixed, each country would9To see this, observe first that, if we wish to achieve the same welfare level with a different value of a particular
tariff   for  , then the same changes in   for   and   for   described just above for
engineering a small change in   can achieve the desired change in any particular tariff   for  , since
changing   for   according to   implies   and   for
.  And the ability to engineer a desired change in a particular transfer   for   is implied directly by the
changes described just above, since according to those changes  . 
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prefer a terms-of-trade improvement:  .  As we have argued extensively
elsewhere (see Bagwell and Staiger, 1999a), by leaving government preferences over local prices
unspecified, our representation of government objectives is very general and is consistent with
national-income-maximizing governments as well as governments that are motivated by various
political/distributional concerns.  
Our three tariffs and two transfers provide one degree of freedom in achieving any level of
welfare for the three governments.  This means that any welfare triple can be achieved with an
arbitrary market-clearing world price or with any one instrument set at an arbitrary level.  To see this,
consider an arbitrary set of policies   and associated welfare levels   for
 and market-clearing world price  .  Suppose that we wish to achieve the same
welfare levels with a different market-clearing world price.  According to (2) and (2a), a small
change   in the market-clearing world price can be engineered as follows: (i) define the change
in   for   according to  ; and (ii) define the change in   for
 according to   implying   by (2a), which
by (2) then implies   and therefore   by (2a).
Hence, the market-clearing condition (2) continues to be satisfied when these policy changes are
made and the market-clearing world price changes by  .  But by (3), these policy changes leave 
for  .  An analogous argument applies if we wish to achieve the same welfare levels with
a different level for any one policy instrument.
9  As this feature is important later, we record it in:
Lemma 1: Any welfare triple can be achieved with an arbitrary market-clearing world price or with
any one instrument set at an arbitrary level.10We assume throughout that   for   is everywhere (twice) differentiable, and that global concavity
conditions are met.
11
2.2 The Efficiency Frontier
Defining  , we may now characterize the efficiency
frontier.  We define the efficiency frontier with respect to the governments’ own preferences, and
it is characterized by the set of solutions to:
s.t. ;   ,
where   and   denote the welfare of the governments of countries B and C, respectively,
evaluated at the efficient policies.  The five first-order conditions that characterize the efficient





; and  .
In words, efficiency conditions (4)-(6) state that, for   respectively, a small change in
which is accompanied by the change in   that keeps B indifferent and the change in   that keeps
C indifferent must keep A indifferent as well.
 
Throughout the paper we restrict our focus to efficient policy combinations that call for tariffs
positioned below the reaction curves of each country, and we ask whether such policy combinations
can be implemented as equilibria of specific bargaining games.  This below-the-reaction-curves11One reason for the reciprocal nature of GATT/WTO tariff commitments is to increase compliance with the
negotiated commitments.  In particular, enforcement in the GATT/WTO is achieved primarily through the threat of
withdrawal of negotiated tariff commitments (see Bagwell and Staiger, 2002, and Bown, forthcoming), a threat that
would be unavailable to a country that was already on its reaction curve.  While we abstract from such enforcement issues
in our formal analysis here, they provide an additional reason for our below-the-reaction-curve focus.     
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restriction comes with little loss of generality.  In each of the games we consider -- as in
GATT/WTO negotiations -- governments agree to bind their tariffs at specified levels, and these
bindings then place upper limits on permissible tariff choices. As a consequence, any efficient
combination of policies that required at least one country to set its tariff above its reaction curve
would be unattainable in the bargaining games we consider, provided only that subsequent to the
conclusion of negotiations each government is permitted (as we assume) to set its tariff unilaterally
subject to the constraint that it does not exceed its negotiated tariff binding.  Efficiency might be
achieved with a subset of countries on their tariff reaction curves, but the unilateral nature of the
tariff commitments that efficiency would require of the remaining countries is at odds with the
“reciprocal” nature of GATT/WTO tariff negotiations.
11  Rather than make these arguments
repeatedly throughout the paper, we focus from the beginning on efficient policy combinations that
call for tariffs positioned below the reaction curves of each country.  We record this restriction as:
(A1) .
In addition to (A1), we restrict our focus as well to efficient points that satisfy:
(A2)  .
At an efficient point satisfying (A2), B and C agree on the direction (if any) that each would like 
to move.  Exploring cases where the incentives of B and C are opposed might also be of interest, but
the aligned case seems to be a natural starting point for analyzing tariff bargaining between A and
each of its trading partners under MFN.  
We treat (A1)-(A2) as maintained assumptions throughout the paper that define the relevant
region of the efficiency frontier.  These assumptions imply the direction in which each government
would prefer each policy to move beginning from an efficient point.  In the Appendix we prove:12For example, this would be standard procedure if country A were negotiating its accession to the WTO as part
of a multilateral round of negotiations with the current members (B and C), although our accession interpretation
abstracts from the possibility of A imposing discriminatory tariffs against B and C should its bid for accession fail.  The
sequential process of negotiations described in the text is also a standard procedure in the market access negotiations that
occur within multilateral rounds, with country B then loosely interpreted as the “principal supplier” of A’s import good
(see, for example, Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995, pp. 66-77).
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Lemma 2: At any efficient point, the following restrictions apply:
(R1)
2.3 The Bargaining Structure
In the following sections we explore whether the efficiency frontier can be reached in specific
bargaining environments where MFN negotiations are sequential, and market access interests are the
organizing principle.  As we discussed in the Introduction, these are central features of WTO
negotiations.  Figure 1 illustrates the basic structure of the sequence of bargains for the governments
of countries A, B and C that we consider.  According to our economic model, exporters from
countries B and C sell into A’s market, while exporters from country A sell into the markets of B
and C, but there are no (direct) market-access issues between countries B and C.  As a consequence,
Figure 1 depicts a sequence of bilateral MFN market access negotiations, first between A and B over
the tariffs each controls and the transfer between them, and second between A and C over the tariffs
each controls and the transfer between them. 
With the basic bargaining structure illustrated in Figure 1, we seek to capture in a stylized
way the issues that can arise in a number of possible WTO negotiating environments.  One
possibility is a sequence of bilateral negotiations that occur within a single multilateral negotiating
“round.”  In this environment it is standard for one government (A) to negotiate MFN tariff
commitments with a sequence of countries (B and C) with which it has mutual market access
interests.
12 A second possibility is a sequence of bilateral negotiations that occur across multilateral
negotiating rounds.  That is, in each new round, it is routine for a government (A) to enter market
access negotiations on a product with one trading partner (C) having negotiated MFN tariff bindings13In this case, A’s subsequent negotiation with C could arise as a result of C’s accession to the WTO (C is a new
member), or as a result of C’s shifting comparative advantage (C is a new supplier).  Here our efficiency results would
apply to the long-run (not the “interim”) bargaining outcomes.
14Lemma 3 is related to Propositions 5 and 8 of Bagwell and Staiger (forthcoming).  As we mentioned in the
Introduction, in that paper we did not allow governments to make bilateral international transfers. Proposition 5 of that
paper established in a discriminatory tariff environment that any efficient tariff vector produces a “lens” that can be
entered into by A and j through mutual reductions in the (discriminatory) tariffs that they apply to one another’s imports.
14
on that product in a previous round with another trading partner (B).
13  
3.  Backward Stealing and Bargaining Inefficiencies
 According to Lemma 2, any point on the efficiency frontier must satisfy (R1), and under
(R1) efficiency conditions (5) and (6) imply:
(7)  for  ,
where we use   for  .  With   on the vertical axis and   on the horizontal axis,
Figure 2 depicts  the “lens” implied by (7).  As Figure 2 illustrates, beginning from any efficient
policy combination, the governments of country A and either of its trading partners can enjoy mutual
gains – at the expense of the government of the third country – if A’s transfer to this trading partner
is increased slightly above the efficient level (denoted  ) and the trading partner’s tariff is reduced
slightly below the efficient level (denoted  ).  We summarize this observation with:
Lemma 3: At any point on the efficiency frontier, and for  , it is possible to reduce   and
increase   so as to increase   and   at the expense of  .
The lens described in Lemma 3 is significant, because it signals the broad potential for a
“backward stealing” problem when governments negotiate bilaterally and sequentially, even when
those negotiations are constrained to abide by MFN.  This problem admits a simple interpretation:
in effect, with no change to its own tariff whatsoever, the government of country A can use its
transfer policy to “pay” one of its trading partners to liberalize and generate a beneficial
improvement in A’s terms of trade, all at the expense of the third country.
14  Proposition 8 of that paper  showed that the MFN restriction can reduce, but cannot eliminate, the possibility of a lens,
in the particular sense that the existence of a lens is confined to a subset of points on the efficiency frontier when the
MFN restriction is imposed.  What Lemma 3 above implies is that even this limited effect of MFN on the existence of
a lens is undone when international transfers are possible.  This is because the possibility of joining MFN tariffs with
bilateral international transfers effectively allows governments to replicate what is achievable with discriminatory tariffs
alone.  This implication may itself be of some independent interest, because it suggests a possible note of caution
regarding the often-stated proposals to make direct international transfers an explicit part of the GATT/WTO system
(see Kowalczyk and Sjostrom, 1994, for a particularly forceful statement of this proposal).  
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We now define the Basic Sequential MFN Game or, for short, the Basic Game.  In stage 1
of this game, country A makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to B concerning tariff bindings (i.e.,
permissible upper bounds)   and  , as well as a transfer from A to B,  .  Then, in stage 2,
country A makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to C concerning bindings   (with the stage-2 binding
 set no higher than its stage-1 level  ) and  , as well as a transfer from A to C,  .  The Basic
Game has the following features: 
Stage 1: A proposes  , which B accepts or rejects.
Stage 2: If B accepts, A proposes  , which C accepts or rejects. 
Figure 3 illustrates the full extensive form of the Basic Game.  Here and throughout the
paper, we assume that, subsequent to the conclusion of negotiations (e.g., after stage 2 of the Basic
Game), each government sets its tariff unilaterally and simultaneously with the other governments
subject to the constraint that it does not exceed its negotiated tariff binding.  We impose a “stability”
condition on tariff reaction curves to rule out the possibility that the imposition of a binding might
move governments from an “unstable” to a “stable” Nash equilibrium.  Denoting j’s best-response
tariff function by   for  (and recalling that subscripts denote partial derivatives), this
stability condition is contained in:
(A3) Each country’s best-response tariff function everywhere satisfies “reaction-curve stability,”
i.e.,   for  .
In words (A3) ensures, for example, that a given reduction in A’s tariff below its reaction curve
would not induce changes in the best-response tariffs of B and C which, together, would induce an
even greater reduction in A’s best-response tariff.  As with (A1) and (A2), we treat (A3) as a15We assume that an interior Nash equilibrium exists in which each country trades in its “natural” direction, i.e.,
in the direction that would prevail absent tariffs.  As Dixit (1987) observed, autarky Nash equilibria may exist as well.
In the event that B and C reject A’s offer, we assume that the interior Nash equilibrium is played.
16 When it is clear from context, we let   denote j’s best-response tariff to the applied tariffs of A and \j when 
for .
16
maintained assumption in what follows.
Consider the simplest subgame first.  If B and C reject, no transfers are paid, no bindings are
agreed to, and all countries play their Nash tariffs   yielding Nash payoffs   for  .
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Consider next the subgame in which B accepts and C rejects.  In this case, there is no transfer
between A and C, and C does not agree to bind its tariff, while A and B agree to bind their tariffs and
agree as well to a transfer between them.  Hence, in this subgame, C selects its best-response tariff,
, to the tariffs applied by A and B under their agreement.  We denote the tariffs applied by A and
B under their agreement by   and  , respectively.  The three
tariffs  ,   and   are defined by the three first order conditions
(8a)  ; ;   and , 
evaluated with   and  , and where   and   are the Lagrange multipliers on the
constraints   and ,  respectively.
16  By  (8a),  is the
applied tariff for A, and B’s applied tariff is  .  In this subgame, A
receives  , B receives  , and
C receives  .
If B rejects and C accepts, then there is no transfer between A and B, and B does not agree
to bind its tariff, while A and C agree to bind their tariffs and agree as well to a transfer between
them.  Hence, in this subgame, B selects its best-response tariff,  ,  to the tariffs applied by A and
C under their agreement.  We denote the tariffs applied by A and C under their agreement by
 and  , respectively.  The three tariffs  ,   and   are
defined by the three first order conditions17
(8b) ; ;  and , 
evaluated with   and  , and where   and   are the Lagrange multipliers on the
constraints   and  , respectively.  By (8b),   is A’s
applied tariff, and   is C’s applied tariff.  In this subgame, A’s payoff
is  , B’s payoff is  , and
C’s payoff is  .  
Finally, if both B and C agree, then we denote the tariffs applied under the (full) agreement
by  ,  , and  .  The three tariffs  ,   and   are defined by the three
first order conditions
(8c) ; ; and , 
evaluated with   and  , and where  ,   and   are the Lagrange multipliers on the
constraints  ,   and  , respectively.  By (8c),  is the
applied tariff for A, B’s applied tariff is  , and C’s applied tariff is
.  In this subgame, the payoffs for A, B and C, are respectively
,  , and  .  Notice that,
while we have taken the function  to be everywhere (twice) differentiable in  , the function
 is not everywhere differentiable in  , because the mapping from bindings to applied tariffs
is not everywhere differentiable.  
We focus on Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SGPE) of the Basic Game.  We will say that the
outcome is efficient (inefficient) when the payoffs correspond to a point on (off) the efficiency
frontier.  Under (A1), we are interested in points on the efficiency frontier where each country’s
(applied) tariff is constrained to lie below its reaction curve.  From the discussion just above,
achieving such a point as the outcome of the Basic Game requires that A reach agreement with both
B and C, and at such a point each country’s applied tariff is then set equal to the level of its binding,
or   for  .  We must then have  ,  , and
.  Hence, we may ask whether there exists a SGPE of the Basic Game in which18
the associated choices of   imply a triple   that is efficient.  We
prove in the Appendix:
Proposition 1: There does not exist a SGPE of the Basic Game in which the outcome is efficient.
This result may be interpreted as follows.  Starting from stage-2 choices that would achieve
the efficiency frontier, A and C can do better for themselves if C liberalizes further (i.e., reduces  ).
C’s import liberalization benefits A by increasing the price of A’s export good on world markets,
and A can compensate C for C’s implied welfare loss with an increased transfer to C (i.e., increased
) while enjoying the gains from higher export prices against B.  Hence, efficient outcomes are
precluded by the backward-stealing problem identified in Lemma 3.
Finally, we observe that, while we have derived Proposition 1 in a take-it-or-leave-it
bargaining context, it is clear from Figure 2 (with  ) that the proposition holds in more general
bargaining environments as well, provided only that the stage-2 bargain between A and C is efficient
(i.e., exhausts all feasible gains from cooperation in that stage) and therefore leads to a tangency
between the indifference curves of A and C in Figure 2.
4.  Forward Manipulation and Bargaining Inefficiencies
Backward stealing prevents efficient outcomes in the Basic Game analyzed in the previous
section.  Suppose, then, that a “security constraint” were introduced into the Basic Game, wherein
the governments of countries A and C were prevented from reducing the welfare of B with their
negotiations.  (We postpone the question of how such a constraint might be maintained until section
6.)  Could governments achieve efficient outcomes in this augmented bargaining game?  In this
section, we show that the answer to this question is generally “No.”  More specifically, we identify
an incentive for “forward manipulation” that can keep governments from the efficiency frontier.  
To accomplish this, we require that the stage-2 agreement in the Basic Game must satisfy the
following security constraint:
(9) . 19
When (9) is required, there certainly can be no backward stealing, because any agreement reached
in stage-2 between A and C must leave B at least as well off as it would be if instead the negotiations
between A and C ended in disagreement and only the stage-1 agreement were implemented.  Hence,
we say that a stage-1 agreement between A and B is secure against backward stealing if and only
if, following an agreement between A and B in stage 1, any agreement between A and C satisfies (9).
We now define the Secure-Contract Game.  In stage 1 of this game, country A makes a take-
it-or-leave-it proposal to B concerning bindings   and  , as well as a transfer from A to B,  .
Then, in stage 2,  country A makes a take-it-or-leave-it proposal to C concerning bindings   (with
the stage-2 binding   set no higher than its stage-1 level  ) and  , as well as a transfer from A
to C,  , subject to ensuring that any agreement reached in stage 1 is secure against backward
stealing.  The Secure-Contract Game has the following features:
Stage 1: A proposes  , which B accepts or rejects.
Stage 2: If B accepts, A proposes ,  where  ,
which C accepts or rejects. 
The full extensive form of the Secure-Contract Game is the same as that illustrated in Figure 3, with
the additional security constraint imposed on stage-2 negotiations.
To characterize the SGPE of the Secure-Contract Game, it is useful to first consider the
disagreement welfare levels in this game for the governments of countries B and C, in the event that
A reaches agreement with the other trading partner.  For B, this disagreement welfare is determined
by the equilibrium of the stage-2 subgame between A and C that follows stage-1 disagreement
between A and B.  Letting A’s equilibrium stage-2 proposal to C in this subgame be denoted by
, and observing that the equilibrium proposal will be accepted by C, B’s disagreement
welfare in its stage-1 negotiation with A is then given by  .  For future reference,
we denote B’s disagreement welfare by  .  Importantly, as viewed from stage 1,   is tied
down by the requirement of subgame perfection, and A therefore has no means by which to
(credibly) manipulate B’s disagreement welfare to its own advantage.  20
Circumstances are different, however, for the government of country C.  Its  disagreement
welfare is given by  .  The key point is that C’s disagreement welfare level depends
on the stage-1 agreement reached between A and B and hence, in contrast to B, A can (credibly)
manipulate C’s disagreement welfare to its own advantage with its stage-1 policy proposal to B.
Recalling that   and that   and
, we now present the next Lemma, which is proved in the Appendix
and summarizes the important properties of  :
Lemma 4 :   for   and  ,
and for any such   that, together with  , fails to drive C to autarky,   is strictly
decreasing in  , strictly increasing in  , and independent of  .
In effect, with disagreement placing C on its reaction curve and for any   and
 that fail to drive C to autarky, C’s disagreement welfare falls with a small
adjustment in either   or   that lowers the implied world price  .  For future
reference, we denote by   the world price that must prevail when C disagrees if its disagreement
welfare is driven to the minimum (autarky) level, which we denote by  .
We wish to explore the conditions under which the SGPE of the Secure-Contract Game lead
to efficient outcomes.  We begin by considering when there exists a stage-1 proposal that efficiently
delivers any (fixed) welfare levels   for B and   for C.  In this way, we characterize
the set of efficient outcomes that are “feasible” (i.e, that would be induced by some stage-1 proposal)
in the Secure-Contract Game.  We then ask whether A would in fact choose to make a proposal that
would induce an outcome from this set in a SGPE of the Secure-Contract Game.  
More formally, we say that it is feasible in the Secure-Contract Game to efficiently deliver
 and   if and only if there exists a triple   such that the outcome of the
Secure-Contract Game is efficient, satisfies (A1) and (A2), and gives B the payoff   and C the
payoff   when the stage-1 proposal is  .  Next, by Lemma 1, we observe that there exists
a policy combination with   fixed at an arbitrary level under which these welfare levels are21
achieved.  Thus, we define  ,  ,   and 
as the tariffs and transfers that solve (4)-(6),   and   for any  ,
 and  .  We say that a value of   is consistent with (A1) and (A2) for   and 
if and only if (A1) and (A2) are satisfied at  ,  ,  , 
and   when  .  
We prove in the Appendix:
Lemma 5 : It is feasible in the Secure-Contract Game to efficiently deliver   and 
if and only if there exists   with   and   consistent with (A1)-(A2) for 
and   such that 
(10a) , and 
(10b) .
The implied stage-1 proposal is then  .
Intuitively, condition (10a) must be satisfied because otherwise the security constraint (9) would hold
with strict inequality at the efficient point and this would give rise to backward stealing, while
condition (10b) must be satisfied because otherwise A could deviate with a lower-than-efficient
transfer to C in stage 2 and be better off (if “<”) or C would reject A’s stage-2 proposal (if “>”). 
We next introduce the following additional assumption:
(A4) Each country’s best-response tariff function everywhere satisfies “terms-of-trade stability,”
i.e.,   for  .
In words (A4) ensures, for example, that the drop in the market-clearing terms-of-trade implied by
a reduction in B’s tariff below its reaction curve would not be completely reversed by the best-
response tariff adjustments of A and C that B’s tariff reduction would induce.  
With Lemma 5 describing the set of efficient outcomes that are feasible in the Secure-
Contract Game, we may now ask whether A would in fact choose to make a stage-1 proposal that22
would induce an outcome from this set in a SGPE of the Secure-Contract Game.  We divide the
possibilities into two cases.
Consider first the possibility that there exists a   that satisfies the conditions of Lemma
5 for some   and   and that, in addition, satisfies:
(11) , and/or  .
In this case, if A and C were to disagree in stage 2, then A would grant B the transfer
 and A’s applied tariff would be   while B’s
applied tariff would be  , with (11) ensuring that   and/or
.  We  prove in the Appendix:
Lemma 6: Under (A4), there does not exist a SGPE of the Secure-Contract Game in which the
outcome is (generically) efficient and satisfies (11) and with   and/or  .
Intuitively, beginning from proposals that efficiently deliver   and  , if   and/or
, then (11) and (A4) together ensure that there exists (generically) an adjustment in   or 
which reduces B’s payoff and/or C’s payoff and, along with adjustments in  ,  ,  , and  ,
improves A’s payoff. 
Consider next the remaining possibility that there exists a   that satisfies the
conditions of Lemma 5 for some   and   and that, in addition, violates (11).  In this case, if A
and C were to disagree in stage 2, then A would still grant B the transfer  , but
the applied tariffs of all three governments would be on their respective reaction curves.  Denoting
by   for   the three Nash tariffs defined by the three equations
,  , and  , conditions (10a) and
(10b) of Lemma 5 then require that there exists a  ,   and   that solve:
(12a) ,  
(12b) , and
(12c) .23
Maintaining our focus on the interior Nash equilibrium (see note 15), it follows from (12b) that when
(11) is violated, we must have  .  Moreover, when the three equations (12a)-(12c) have a
solution in the three unknowns  ,   and  , this solution will (generically)
imply .   
We now introduce the following additional assumption:
(A5) Each country’s best-response tariff function is sensitive to its transfer, i.e.,  for 
.
We prove in the Appendix:
Lemma 7: Under (A5), there does not exist a SGPE of the Secure-Contract Game in which the
outcome is (generically) efficient and violates (11).
Lemma 7 holds because (A5) ensures that, beginning from a stage-1 proposal that would achieve
efficiency but that violates (11), it is (generically) possible for A to adjust   and reduce B’s payoff
and/or C’s payoff (by altering the best-response tariffs), and A can make adjustments to its other
instruments to assure that it gains from these adjustments. 
Finally, as A can do no better for itself in the Secure-Contract Game than to efficiently
deliver   to B and   to C, this outcome will be achieved in any SGPE of the Secure-Contract
Game if it is feasible.  We may therefore state: 
Proposition 2: Under (A4) and (A5), in any SGPE of the Secure-Contract Game, the outcome is
(generically) efficient if and only if there exists a   satisfying the conditions of Lemma 5 for
 and   . 
That   is required for efficiency in the Secure-Contract Game is neither particularly
surprising nor particularly demanding.  However, efficiency in the Secure-Contract Game also
requires that  , and this requirement places rather extreme demands on the environment
within which the Secure-Contract Game delivers governments to the efficiency frontier.17The solution to (13a) must be unique provided that   is sufficiently insensitive to changes in  . We
emphasize this case in our discussion, but the case where multiple solutions to (13a) exist may be accommodated as well
(at the expense of additional notation), and does not alter our qualitative conclusions.  
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To further interpret the conditions for efficiency expressed in Proposition 2, we next observe
that achieving   requires that C face its autarky terms-of-trade   in the event that it
rejects A’s stage-2 proposal, and therefore by (A3) and (A4) a stage-1 proposal that achieves
efficiency requires in turn that  .  With this observation, conditions (10a) and




By Lemma 1 there exists a policy combination   under which the welfare levels
 and   are delivered efficiently and  .  Setting   implies
 and ensures that (13a) is satisfied.  Provided that   is consistent with
(A1)-(A2) for   and  , the key remaining question then becomes: Does there exist a 
such that (13b) is satisfied , i.e., such that  ?  If not, and provided that  
is the unique solution to (13a), we may then conclude under (A4) and (A5) that there cannot exist
a SGPE of the Secure-Contract Game in which the outcome is efficient.
17 
If there exists a   such that  , then with B’s tariff fixed at 
and with C on its tariff reaction curve, A’s own best-response tariff must be sufficiently high so that,
if A were to select this best-response tariff, C’s natural trade pattern would be halted (when
) and potentially reversed (when  ).  That such
an outcome could in principle be optimal for A can be seen by considering the example where A’s
government seeks to maximize national income with its tariff choice, and where with B’s tariff fixed
at   and C on its reaction curve, the implied terms of trade when A adopts a policy of free trade
happens to be just slightly higher than C’s autarky price.  In this circumstance, C’s trade volume with
A is small, and even a small tariff by A would reduce the terms of trade and reverse C’s trading25
pattern, but this could nevertheless be optimal for A if B is a big trading partner relative to C and A
enjoys the associated terms-of-trade gains on its trade volume with B.  This example, though, also
reveals that this outcome could not be optimal if C accounts for a sufficiently sizable fraction of A’s
multilateral trade.  In light of this discussion, we may therefore state:
Corollary: Under (A4) and (A5), there cannot exist a SGPE of the Secure-Contract Game in which
the outcome is (generically) efficient unless C is sufficiently small relative to B.
Proposition 2 and its Corollary reflect a simple point.  If it is feasible for A to propose a set
of tariffs and transfers that is efficient and gives B and C their minimal possible payoffs in the
Secure-Contract Game, then A will surely propose this set of tariffs and transfers. But the demands
placed on   to ensure feasibility are substantial.  In particular, with   tied down by the
combination of policies to which A must navigate to achieve this outcome, it must then be feasible
for A to position   so that C faces autarky if it rejects A’s stage-2 proposal.  If this cannot be
accomplished with a choice of  , because for example accomplishing this would require A to set
an applied tariff   that was above its best-response level, then A cannot both give C its minimal
payoff   and achieve efficiency, and in this case A will find it desirable to sacrifice efficiency
in order to lower C’s payoff toward  .  More generally, Proposition 2 and its Corollary suggest
that governments will achieve efficient bargaining outcomes in the Secure-Contract Game under
some special circumstances, but under many plausible circumstances the outcome of the Secure-
Contract Game is inefficient. 
The source of inefficiency identified in Proposition 2 arises from A’s desire to use its stage-1
negotiations with B to position itself more favorably for stage-2 negotiations with C by sticking C
with a less-favorable disagreement point.  Figure 4 illustrates.  With  on the vertical axis and 
on the horizontal axis, we consider a triple   under which it is feasible in the Secure-
Contract Game to efficiently deliver   and  .  Under (A5), we have shown by
Lemma 7 that attention may be restricted to stage-1 proposals that satisfy (11), and for purposes of
illustration we assume that   and  .  According to Proposition
2, A would not choose   and   if it chooses  .  We wish to illustrate in this case that it is18As noted, Figure 4 illustrates the case where   and  .  If there exists a   under which
it is feasible to efficiently deliver   and   in the Secure-Contract Game, then at this point there is no
lens between A and B.  For example, in the case where    and  , a small change
in   and an accompanying change in   that left B indifferent would leave C indifferent as well (C would be indifferent
to any small change in   and   by the first-order condition that defines  ), and so by efficiency conditions (4) and
(6) A’s indifference curve must be tangent to B’s indifference curve as well in this case.
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always possible for A to raise its welfare by proposing  .  To understand why, let us fix 
at   and consider varying the proposed   and   around   and  , respectively, so as to hold
 fixed at  . Under the security constraint, B will accept any such proposal.
Further, let the stage-2 proposal of   that is associated with any   maximize
 subject to   and   and  .  Clearly,
C will accept the stage-2 proposal, and so by construction the welfare level for A associated with
 is attainable in the Secure-Contract Game.  In effect, then, with   fixed at  , any
change in   and   implies by this construction an associated change in  , and Figure 4
depicts the welfare consequences of these associated changes. 
Consider, then, the indifference curves associated with  ,   and 
under this construction which pass through the efficient point ( ,  ) in Figure 4.  C’s indifference
curve is horizontal through this point, since   is strictly decreasing in 
but independent of   by Lemma 4.  B’s indifference curve through this point could have positive
or negative slope (it is depicted in the figure with positive slope) but, importantly, it cannot be
horizontal, since   is strictly increasing in  .  Therefore, the indifference
curves associated with   and   are not tangent to each other as they pass through
the efficient point ( ,  ) in Figure 4, and as a consequence, by efficiency conditions (4) and (6),
A’s indifference curve cannot be tangent to either B’s or C’s indifference curve at this point.
Moreover, A’s indifference curve must be flatter than B’s at this point, since otherwise a
“downward” lens would exist between the indifference curves of A and B into which A and B could
move and all three governments would gain, contradicting the efficiency of this point.  Therefore,
as Figure 4 depicts, there is an “upward” lens created by the indifference curves of A and B at this
point, implying that A can gain by raising   above   and adjusting   to maintain B’s welfare.
A’s gain from this maneuver comes at the expense of C’s welfare (and multilateral efficiency).
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We observe that this logic is related to a concern about the “foot-dragging” maneuver for
handling “free-riders” as this maneuver was described in the Introduction.  According to this
concern, country A might be induced under MFN to offer “too little” in the way of trade
liberalization to its early negotiating partners, in order to maintain its bargaining position for later
negotiations.  Proposition 2 can be interpreted as providing a formal justification for this concern,
and Figure 4 illustrates the foot-dragging incentive to maintain   above its efficient level.
 
In summary, Proposition 2 and its Corollary indicate that the Secure-Contract Game can
deliver efficient bargaining outcomes only in a very limited set of circumstances.  In the
circumstances where inefficiency arises, this inefficiency is associated with forward manipulation.
In the next section, we consider how this new source of inefficiency might be handled.
5.  Preventing Forward Manipulation through GATT/WTO Rules
One way to correct the inefficiency associated with forward manipulation is to eliminate the
possibility of forward manipulation itself.  In principle, this might be achieved by introducing
renegotiation opportunities, provided that these renegotiation opportunities are sufficiently
“sweeping” so that they separate C’s disagreement payoff from the stage-1 determination of
.  Indeed, the GATT/WTO explicitly allows for renegotiation.  This is true both within a
multilateral round of negotiation, when agreements reached between negotiating pairs early in the
round are viewed as tentative and may be revisited if subsequent negotiations with other partners do
not go as expected (e.g., Jackson, 1969, p. 220), and it is also true outside of multilateral rounds,
where explicit renegotiations of previous agreements are permitted (e.g., Jackson, 1969, pp. 229-
238).  Just how sweeping these renegotiating opportunities are is a question of degree, and
presumably depends on circumstances.  In this section, we consider whether introducing sweeping
renegotiation possibilities into the Secure-Contract Game can solve the forward manipulation
problem and lead (in the presence of the security constraint) to efficient outcomes. 
We first describe the novel features of the Contract Renegotiation Game:28
Stage 1:  A proposes  , which B accepts or rejects.
Stage 2: If B accepts, A proposes  , where  ,
which C accepts or rejects.
Stage 3:  If B accepts in Stage 1 and C rejects in Stage 2, then A proposes  ,
which B accepts or rejects.
The full extensive form of the Contract Renegotiation Game is given in Figure 5. 
In the Secure-Contract Game, the source of inefficiency can be traced to the problem of
forward manipulation, whereby A’s stage-1 proposal to B influences C’s disagreement payoff in its
stage-2 negotiations with A.  In the Contract Renegotiation Game, this linkage has been curtailed,
but it has not been eliminated.  To see this, note that if B accepts A’s stage-1 proposal, then if C
rejects in stage 2 its disagreement payoff will be determined by the renegotiation between A and B
in stage 3.  In this case, the details of A’s stage-1 proposal to B are immaterial for C’s disagreement
payoff in its stage-2 negotiations with A, provided only that B accepts A’s stage-1 proposal and
therefore “locks in” a stage-3 renegotiation opportunity with A should C disagree in stage 2.
However, if B does not accept A’s stage-1 proposal, then B has no renegotiation rights with A in
stage 3, and so in this case C’s disagreement payoff in its stage-2 negotiations with A will be its
Nash payoff.  As a consequence, in the Contract Renegotiation Game the possibility of forward
manipulation has been reduced to the question of “bypass”: Might A choose to make an unacceptable
proposal to B in stage 1 in order to bypass B and negotiate with C against a Nash disagreement
payoff?  The question of bypass can also be seen to arise with C: Having made a stage-1 proposal
that was accepted by B, might A choose to make an unacceptable proposal to C in stage 2 in order
to bypass C and renegotiate with B against a Nash disagreement payoff in stage 3?
To ensure that the bypass problem does not prevent governments from reaching the efficiency
frontier in the Contract Renegotiation Game, an additional condition is needed.  To state this
condition, consider the particular disagreement welfare levels in this game for the governments of
countries B and C, in the event that A reaches agreement with the other trading partner.  For the
government of country B, this disagreement welfare is determined by the equilibrium of the stage-219It might be wondered why (A6) is not needed to rule out bypass in the Secure-Contract Game.  The reason
is that, after B accepts, A can pin C at a welfare level that is lower than  , since no further negotiations follow, and
so A has no incentive to bypass B in the Secure-Contract Game.
20Formally, for  , and with  , consider the three tariffs defined by  ,   and
.  Country j may be said to be a symmetric participant with A in a multilateral Nash tariff war if the terms of trade
implied by these three tariffs is equal to the terms of trade implied by the Nash tariffs defined by   for  .
Intuitively, with country   positioned on its reaction curve, when countries A and j are symmetric participants in a
multilateral Nash tariff war, neither succeeds in moving the terms of trade in its favor relative to the terms of trade that
would obtain if each chose its tariff “without terms-of-trade considerations in mind,” i.e, so as to solve   for A
and   for  j.  With this definition in hand, it may now be seen that, if A and j are symmetric participants in the
multilateral Nash tariff war, then a bilateral agreement between them could achieve   for A and   for j while
preserving the Nash terms of trade, thereby preserving as well the welfare of  ; but from here A could do better yet with
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subgame between A and C that follows stage-1 disagreement between A and B.  This subgame is
identical to that in the Secure-Contract Game, and we previously recorded B’s payoff in this
subgame as  , which we denoted by  .  For the
government of country C, this disagreement welfare is determined by the equilibrium of the stage-3
(renegotiation) subgame between A and B that follows stage-1 agreement between A and B and
stage-2 disagreement between A and C.  Denoting A’s equilibrium proposal in this subgame by
, C’s payoff in this subgame is  , which for
future reference we denote by  .  
Importantly, as viewed from stage 1 (stage 2),    ( ) is tied down by the requirement
of subgame perfection, and A therefore has no means by which to manipulate these disagreement
payoff levels to its own advantage.  Bypass, however, concerns the possibility that A might choose
to confront a negotiating partner with the disagreement payoff   rather than   for  .
We now state a sufficient condition to rule out the bypass problem: 
(A6)  ; .
Under (A6), the minimal disagreement payoffs for B and C in the Contract Renegotiation Game are
given by   and  ,  respectively, and each of these disagreement payoffs is achieved only when
A reaches an initial agreement with the other trading partner.
19  Condition (A6) essentially requires
that B and C not be too asymmetric with A when they participate in a multilateral Nash tariff war.
20an alternative proposal that worsened j’s terms of trade below the Nash terms of trade and compensated j with a higher
transfer  , and the lower-than-Nash terms of trade under this alternative proposal would leave   with a lower-than-Nash
welfare (for the proof that a government positioned on its tariff reaction curve experiences welfare changes that are the
same sign as changes in its terms of trade, see the proof of Lemma 4 in the Appendix).  Arguing in this fashion, it can
be seen that (A6) holds if B and C are not too asymmetric with A when they participate in a multilateral Nash tariff war.
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We next consider the feasibility of efficiently delivering   to B and   to C
in the Contract Renegotiation Game.  We say that it is feasible in the Contract Renegotiation Game
to efficiently deliver   and   if and only if there exists a triple   such that
the outcome of the Contract Renegotiation Game is efficient, satisfies (A1) and (A2), and gives B
the payoff   and C the payoff   when the stage-1 proposal is  .  Our finding is proved
in the Appendix and contained in the following:
Lemma 8 : Under (A6), it is feasible in the Contract Renegotiation Game to efficiently deliver
 and   if and only if there exists   with   and 
consistent with (A1)-(A2) for   and   such that 
(14a) , and
(14b) .
The implied stage-1 proposal is then  .
Intuitively, as with conditions (10a) and (10b) of Lemma 5, (14a) must be satisfied because
otherwise the security constraint (9) would hold with strict inequality at the efficient point and this
would give rise to backward stealing, while condition (14b) must be satisfied because otherwise A
could deviate with a lower-than-efficient transfer to C in stage 2 and be better off (if “<”) or C would
reject A’s stage-2 proposal (if “>”). 
With Lemma 8 describing the set of efficient outcomes that are feasible in the Contract
Renegotiation Game, we may now ask whether A would in fact choose to make a stage-1 proposal
that would induce an outcome from this set in a SGPE of the Contract Renegotiation Game.
Condition (14b) of Lemma 8 requires that  , so suppose there exists a   satisfying
the conditions of Lemma 8 for  .  By (14a), we have  .
Choose a small adjustment in   to   and   to   and a   that solves21As a general solution to the forward manipulation problem, a further possible limitation of the kind of
sweeping renegotiation opportunities that we have considered here is that, in a broader model, such renegotiation
opportunities might themselves impede the negotiation of meaningful market access commitments.  
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 while maintaining  .  Generically,
such an adjustment exists, and for a sufficiently small adjustment we have as well that   is
consistent with (A1)-(A2) for   and  . Therefore, by Lemma 8, it is (generically) feasible for
A to efficiently deliver   to B and   to C whenever it is feasible for A to efficiently
deliver   to B and   to C, and so A would never choose the latter.  As A can do no
better for itself in the Contract Renegotiation Game than to efficiently deliver   to B and 
to C, it will do so when it is feasible to do so, and we may therefore conclude:
Proposition 3: Under (A6), in any SGPE of the Contract Renegotiation Game, the outcome is
(generically) efficient if and only if there exists a   satisfying the conditions of Lemma 8 for
.
In effect, under (A6), the key to attaining efficient outcomes in the Contract Renegotiation
Game is condition (14a) of Lemma 8, which derives from the security constraint to prevent backward
stealing: attaining efficiency does not require that further conditions be met to avoid the hazards of
forward manipulation.  When viewed in light of Proposition 2 and its Corollary, Proposition 3
therefore suggests that renegotiation provisions such as those provided in the GATT/WTO can
alleviate the efficiency costs associated with forward manipulation, in the sense that efficient
bargaining outcomes may be anticipated in a wider set of circumstances, at least so long as these
provisions allow for sufficiently “sweeping” renegotiation opportunities as we have modeled them
here.  Still, as (A6) indicates, as a general solution to forward manipulation, renegotiation has its
limits, as it may introduce a bypass problem into negotiations in some circumstances (i.e., in the
circumstances where (A6) is violated).
21    
6. Preventing Backward Stealing through GATT/WTO Rules
We now reconsider and interpret the security constraint imposed in section 4 and maintained
throughout section 5 (i.e., the requirement that  ). As suggested by our22Shirono (2004) provides empirical evidence of this form of reciprocity in GATT/WTO negotiations.  
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“terms-of-trade manipulation” interpretation of the backward stealing problem offered in section 3,
there is a link between this security constraint and a requirement that stage-2 negotiations between
A and C leave unaltered the terms-of-trade implied as a result of stage-1 negotiations.  This link is
suggestive of a role for GATT/WTO rules in this regard, because as we have shown elsewhere
(Bagwell and Staiger, 1999a, 2002) the GATT/WTO norm of reciprocity can be interpreted as fixing
the terms of trade, in the sense that “reciprocal” changes in market access, i.e., changes that preserve
the balance of market access rights and obligations, leave the terms of trade unaltered.
22  Guided by
this suggestion, we ask: Is there something in GATT/WTO rules that might work along the lines of
such a security constraint?      
To answer this question within our bargaining games, we focus on B’s opportunity to respond
to subsequent negotiations between A and C that upset B’s original balance of market access rights
and obligations in a way that is unfavorable to B (i.e., that worsen B’s terms of trade from the level
implied by B’s agreement with A).  In this circumstance, we consider the possibility that B has the
opportunity to respond with a tariff increase above its bound level that restores this original balance
(i.e., that restores the original terms of trade).  This opportunity can be seen to exist in the
GATT/WTO under the “within rounds” interpretation of these games, in the sense that governments
may choose to modify or withdraw tentatively offered concessions when imbalances arise at the
conclusion of a round of GATT/WTO negotiations.  And it can be seen to exist as well under the
“between rounds” interpretation of these games, because governments have the opportunity to seek
redress under the “non-violation nullification-or-impairment” provisions contained in GATT Article
XXIII when they experience nullification or impairment of their market access rights as a result of
a negotiating partner’s subsequent (and GATT-legal) actions.  In this section, we seek to capture this
opportunity formally, and ask whether it might serve an analogous role to the security constraint
analyzed above.  For concreteness, we focus explicitly on the between-rounds interpretation, and in
particular on the possible role for non-violation complaints in this context.23Formally, we may define the market access that one country affords to a second by the first country’s volume
of import demand for the exports of the second country at a given world price. Hence, the market access that countries
B and C each afford to A at a given world price   is defined by their respective import demands at that world price:
 for  .  Similarly, the market access that country A affords to country j is A’s
residual import demand for j’s exports – after the other country’s export supply to A has been netted out – at a given
world price:   for  .  Finally, we define the
balance of market access rights and obligations between A and j that is implied by a vector of negotiated tariffs and
transfers at a given world price by   for  , where
all tariffs are evaluated at their applied levels.  With this definition, it is then straightforward to show that two vectors
of tariffs imply the same balance of market access rights and obligations if and only if they imply the same terms of trade.
For further discussion of the relationship between the balance of market access rights and obligations and the terms of
trade, see Bagwell and Staiger (2002).
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We introduce B’s opportunity to respond to a non-violation nullification-or-impairment of
its market access rights as follows.  First, we define   as the level of B’s tariff which, in
combination with   and  , would maintain the terms of trade at the level implied by A’s stage-1
agreement with B.  Thus, for example, in the event that   and   bind A and C below their
respective reaction curves,   is defined implicitly by  .  We then
provide B with the opportunity to increase its tariff binding from an initially agreed-upon level 
to   whenever A and C reach agreement in stage-2 that implies a worsening of B’s terms of trade
(i.e., that implies  ).  In this way, we endow B with the opportunity
to restore the original balance of market access rights and obligations between it and country A if
this balance is upset by A’s subsequent negotiations with C.
23  
We now describe the WTO-Contract Game:
Stage 1:  A proposes  , which B accepts or rejects.
Stage 2: If B accepts, A proposes  , which C accepts or rejects. 
Stage  3: If B accepts in Stage 1 and C accepts in Stage 2, then B  selects
.
Stage 4:  If B accepts in Stage 1 and C rejects in Stage 2, then A proposes  ,
which B accepts or rejects.
The full extensive form of the WTO-Contract Game is given in Figure 6. 
As compared to the Contract Renegotiation Game, the WTO-Contract Game displays two24In the interests of simplification, we have abstracted from a number of the legal/institutional elements
associated with non-violation complaints in the GATT/WTO (see Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger, 2002, for a recent
discussion of non-violation complaints in the GATT/WTO).  Among them is the notion of what level of market access
B could reasonably anticipate it had attained in its stage-1negotiation with A.  Arguably, as the WTO is a forum for
bilateral negotiations, it would be unreasonable for B not to anticipate that countries A and C might engage in subsequent
negotiations.  But these subsequent negotiations may be structured in a variety of ways, some of which could potentially
have large adverse impacts on B’s interests.  If the GATT/WTO norm of reciprocity is seen to define what B can
reasonably anticipate concerning the outcome of A’s subsequent negotiations with C, then it may be concluded that the
anticipated stage-2 negotiations will leave B unaffected, and hence the level of market access that country B can
reasonably anticipate as a result of its stage-1 negotiations with country A is simply that which is implied by their stage-1
negotiations.  Notice that, according to this argument, reciprocity is not being imposed as an additional restriction on
the outcome of stage-2 agreements.  Instead, reciprocity is introduced as a negotiating norm: if a bilateral negotiation
does not satisfy this norm, then the parties to the negotiation may be vulnerable to claims of nullification or impairment
by a third party, if the third party had previously negotiated a market access agreement with one of them.  In this regard,
Hudec (1990, pp. 23-24) notes that the designers of GATT added nullification-or-impairment provisions precisely out
of a concern for maintaining reciprocity established by negotiated market access agreements.  Examples of bilateral
agreements triggering non-violation complaints include (i). The U.S. complaint regarding tariff preferences negotiated
by the EC on citrus products from certain Mediterranean countries, and (ii). The EC complaint regarding aspects of the
bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Japan concerning trade in semiconductor products. 
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differences.  First, in stage 2, the security constraint is no longer imposed.  And second, immediately
after stage 2 (in the new stage 3), B’s non-violation nullification-or-impairment response is inserted,
permitting B to choose to increase its tariff binding if this is required to prevent A’s stage-2
agreement with C from eroding B’s terms of trade.
24  
We seek conditions under which any SGPE of the WTO-Contract Game will achieve a point
on the efficiency frontier.  We focus on the feasibility of efficiently delivering   to B and 
to C under (A6), since if this is feasible in the WTO-Contract Game then A will surely make
proposals that implement it.  We say that it is feasible in the WTO-Contract Game to efficiently
deliver   and   if and only if there exists a triple   such that the outcome of the
WTO-Contract Game is efficient, satisfies (A1) and (A2), and gives B the payoff    and C the
payoff   when the stage-1 proposal is  .  
Further progress can be made by considering a particular combination of efficient policies
that we have elsewhere (e.g., Bagwell and Staiger, 1999a) referred to as politically optimal policies.
More specifically, for any level of transfers the politically optimal tariffs solve   for
, and it can be shown that politically optimal tariffs achieve the efficiency frontier defined25This can be seen by inspection once the three efficiency conditions (4)-(6) are expressed in terms of the
alternative   functions, yielding the following three conditions: 
for  , and   where  . 
26There must exist a set of politically optimal policies that delivers   and   provided only that the
politically optimal tariffs are bounded from above and from below as transfers are altered.  
27More specifically, (A1) and (A2) may be restated in terms of the   functions as, respectively,
 for  , and  .
With politically optimal tariffs defined by   for  , it is now direct to confirm that politically optimal
tariffs satisfy (A1) and (A2).   
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by (4)-(6).
25  Intuitively, politically optimal tariffs are efficient, because the incentive of governments
to manipulate the terms of trade with their tariff choices is the source of international inefficiency
in the Nash equilibrium and politically optimal tariffs do not reflect this incentive.  We denote by 
the vector of politically optimal tariffs   for   that, along with associated transfers  ,
efficiently deliver   and  , and let  .
26 
By the first-order conditions that define them, politically optimal tariffs satisfy (A1)-(A2).
27
Suppose, then, that there exists a   and a   such that the stage-1 proposal
 satisfies the condition  .  If A were to make this
proposal in stage-1 and B accepted, then the level of   which defines B’s stage-3 non-violation
right in response to a stage-2 agreement reached between A and C is defined implicitly by
.  Turning now to stage 2, if A were to make a stage-2 proposal of
 and if C were to accept this proposal, then   and in stage 3
B would select  , and in this way   and   would be delivered efficiently with
politically optimal policies.  Hence, we may conclude that, provided there is no alternative stage-2
proposal which would be preferred by A, the existence of the stage-1 proposal described above is
sufficient to ensure that it is feasible in the WTO-Contract Game to efficiently deliver   and
, and therefore that the outcome of the WTO-Contract Game will be efficient.  
Consider, then, the possibility that A might deviate to an alternative stage-2 proposal.
Observe first that politically optimal tariffs exhibit the special feature that no government would
desire a different trade volume if this possibility were offered to it at fixed terms of trade (this is28To see that a stage-2 proposal by A implying   implies in turn that  , observe that: (i) stage-3
permits   in this case; and (ii)   in this case, so that B’s best-response tariff is strictly above   (see
note 27), and therefore B desires   in this case as well.   That A’s payoff must fall with a deviant stage-2 proposal
which leads to a deterioration in its terms of trade (i.e., a rise in  ) can be seen as follows.  Beginning from the political
optimum, A can do no better under a rising   than if the tariffs of A and C are adjusted so as to maintain   for 
and   is adjusted so as to maintain  .  In this case, we have that  , where the
second equality follows from (3), and  therefore  , where the second equality
follows from (2) and (3).  
29 The fact that a large country might potentially “win the tariff war” with a smaller country was pointed out
originally by Johnson (1953-54) in the context of national-income-maximizing governments and explored further by
Kennan and Riezman (1988).  In those papers, a country’s welfare under Nash tariffs is compared to its welfare under
free trade, and a country is said to win the tariff war if the former is bigger than the latter.  The comparison we make
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what   for   means).  As a consequence, A could not do better under a deviant stage-
2 proposal that satisfied   in light of B’s stage-3 response, i.e., under a deviant
stage-2 proposal that implies  .  There are two remaining possibilities.
One possibility is that A could deviate to a stage-2 proposal implying  , in which case
 and  .  But even if such a proposal could provide A and C with their ideal
trade volumes (and therefore satisfy   for  ) at the new terms of trade, the decline in
A’s terms of trade implied by   ensures that A cannot gain under such a deviation.
28
The other possibility is that A could deviate to a stage-2 proposal implying
, in which case   and  .  The potential
for A to gain from this kind of deviation arises because, with   already determined in stage
1, A could conceivably achieve higher welfare with tariff levels for itself and C which placed B on
its tariff reaction curve than with politically optimal tariffs.  Letting   denote the
choices of   that maximize   while delivering   to C, this
potential is ruled out by:
(A7) .
If (A7) were violated, then by negotiating with C, A could “win the tariff war” with B (i.e, with the
transfer to B   paid in either case, A could do better under non-cooperative tariff interaction with
B than under the politically optimal tariffs).
29 Assumption (A7) effectively rules out this extremeabove is related, but with two differences.  First, the definition of   gives A a Stackelberg-leader position
while B is the Stackelberg follower, so that A’s welfare when it interacts non-cooperatively with B is its Stackelberg-
leader welfare, rather than its Nash welfare.  Hence, the first difference is that the “tariff war” we refer to here is the
Stackelberg tariff war rather than the Nash tariff war.  And second, rather than comparing the welfare under the tariff
war to that under free trade, we compare it to welfare under politically optimal tariffs.  We invoke the “win the tariff war”
terminology in the text above, because in the special case of national-income-maximizing governments politically optimal
tariffs correspond to free trade, and so in this case our comparison is between the (Stackelberg) tariff war and free trade.
30If both   and   impose a binding constraint on A and B, respectively, when C disagrees, then
.  If only   is non-binding, then   by
(A3) and (A4).  Finally, if   is non-binding, then   by (A3) and (A4).  
31This is suggestive of an efficiency-enhancing role for the “principal supplier” rule of the GATT/WTO,
whereby the largest suppliers to a market are typically granted the position of the early negotiating partners.  
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degree of asymmetry, by requiring that B is not so small that A could win the tariff war.
Having established that there is no alternative stage-2 proposal which would be preferred by
A, we may now state: 
Proposition 4: Under (A6)-(A7) , in any SGPE of the WTO-Contract Game, the outcome is efficient
if there exists a   and a   such that the stage-1 proposal 
satisfies .
Proposition 4 provides a sufficient condition for efficient outcomes in the WTO-Contract
Game.  To get a sense of the circumstances under which this condition is met, we note that under
(A3) and (A4), the highest value of   consistent with   and   is
achieved at   and  .  With   and  , (A3) and (A4) then imply
.
30  On the other hand, the lowest value of    is achieved at
 and  , and unless B is sufficiently small relative to C we must then
have  .  As a consequence, we may state:
Corollary: Under (A4), (A6) and (A7), in any SGPE of the WTO-Contract Game, the outcome is
efficient unless B is sufficiently small relative to C.
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Observe that, if   when   and  , then achieving efficient
politically optimal tariffs in the WTO-Contract Game will require that B utilize its non-violation38
right (i.e., we must then have  ).  On the other hand, if   when 
and  , then achieving efficient politically optimal tariffs in the WTO-Contract Game can be
achieved without the utilization of B’s non-violation right (i.e., we may then have  ), but in
this case negotiations between A and C must conform to reciprocity (i.e., the movement from 
to   and from   to   must leave the terms of trade unaltered).
More broadly, in light of this discussion it is evident that the backward stealing and forward
manipulation problems which prevent governments from achieving efficient bargaining outcomes
under sequential bilateral negotiations in MFN environments (Propositions 1 and 2) can in principle
be addressed with the inclusion of features that have representation in the bargaining environment
shaped by WTO rules.  In particular, opportunities for renegotiation can in principle prevent the
inefficiencies that arise as a result of the forward manipulation problem (Proposition 3), while non-
violation nullification-or-impairment rights operating within a reciprocity norm can in principle
prevent the inefficiencies associated with backward stealing (Proposition 4). 
7.  Conclusion
Motivated by the structure of WTO negotiations, we analyze a bargaining environment in
which negotiations proceed bilaterally and sequentially under the MFN principle.  Our analysis
proceeds in two steps.  In a first step, we identify backward-stealing and forward-manipulation
problems that arise when governments bargain under the MFN principle in a sequential fashion.  We
show that these problems impede governments from achieving the multilateral efficiency frontier
unless further rules of negotiation are imposed.  In our second step, we identify the WTO reciprocity
norm and its nullification-or-impairment and renegotiation provisions as rules that are capable of
providing solutions to these problems.  In this way, we suggest that WTO rules can facilitate the
negotiation of efficient multilateral trade agreements in a world in which the addition of new and
economically significant countries to the world trading system is an ongoing process.
We have shown that the backward-stealing and forward-manipulation problems arise under
very general circumstances, and that these problems can be interpreted as reflecting underlying39
incentives to manipulate the terms of trade.  We reiterate here, though, that these problems can
equally well be given an interpretation in terms of market access: each problem reflects the
incentives of negotiating partners to position the balance of market access rights and obligations in
a way that is disadvantageous for unrepresented governments.  When interpreted from this
perspective, the backward stealing and forward manipulation problems take on heightened practical
relevance, because the balance of market access rights and obligations is a dominate theme in
GATT/WTO discussions.  And from this perspective, the potential importance of the role played by
the WTO reciprocity norm and its nullification-or-impairment and renegotiation provisions in
facilitating efficient bargaining outcomes may be appreciated.  
Finally, while we have focused on the possibility of achieving efficient bargaining outcomes
in various negotiating environments, we have not characterized equilibrium outcomes in the
environments where efficiency cannot be achieved.  Hence our results do not indicate the likely
severity of the inefficiency that arises when backward stealing and forward manipulation problems
are present.  We leave this important task to future research. 40
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we provide proofs of all Lemmas and Propositions not established in the text.
Lemma 2: At any efficient point, the following restrictions apply:
(R1)
Proof: (A1) states (R1)(i) directly.  For (R1)(iii), note that  (A1), (A2) and (4) imply   for
.  But   and   for
, and so   for   implies   for
.  We therefore have (R1)(iii).  Finally, together with (5) and (6), (A1) and (R1)(iii) imply
for  , which gives (R1)(ii). QED
Proposition 1: There does not exist a SGPE of the Basic Game in which the outcome is efficient.
Proof: As illustrated by Figure 2 when  j is set to C, A could improve upon any stage-2 proposal
( ) that, in combination with   , attained a point on the efficiency frontier, because
with a slight reduction in   below   and a slight increase in   above  , A could move into
the lens depicted in Figure 2, and C would accept this proposal.   QED
Lemma 4 :    for   and  ,
and for any such   that, together with  , fails to drive C to autarky,   is strictly
decreasing in  , strictly increasing in  , and independent of  .
Proof: Utilizing the relationship  , we observe that
, while C’s reaction curve is defined implicitly by
   where  . It follows that, with   and
 and therefore  , and with C positioned on
its reaction curve,   provided that   and   are non-
prohibitive.  Analogous arguments applied to   imply  .
   QED44
Lemma 5 : It is feasible in the Secure-Contract Game to efficiently deliver   and 
if and only if there exists   with   and   consistent with (A1) and (A2)
for   and   such that 
(10a) , and 
(10b) .
The implied stage-1 proposal is then  .
Proof: If the conditions of the Lemma are satisfied, then a stage-1 proposal of
 will be followed by a stage-2 proposal of  , 
and   , and each proposal will be accepted, delivering   and   efficiently.  Given
this stage-1 proposal, A can do no better for itself with an alternative stage-2 proposal, since that
would require that either B get less than  , which would violate the security constraint, or that C
get less than  , which C would not accept.  Going the other way, if (10a) is violated, then the
security constraint and   imply that  , but then
by Lemma 3 backward stealing in stage 2 would preclude efficiency.  If (10b) is violated, then either
, but then A could increase its welfare by deviating from the
efficient policies to propose instead  , or else  ,
but then C would reject A’s stage-2 offer.   QED
Lemma 6: Under (A4), there does not exist a SGPE of the Secure-Contract Game in which the
outcome is (generically) efficient and satisfies (11) and with   and/or  .
Proof: Consider any efficient outcome that is feasible in the Secure-Contract Game and for which,
by (11),   and/or  .  Starting from the stage-1 proposal
, we must establish that A can find an alternative stage-1 proposal that
it strictly prefers as long as   and/or  .  (I) Suppose  .  (A) If
, then increase the proposed   slightly; this leads to a strict reduction in 
by  Lemma 4 if   and by (A4) if instead  , thereby ensuring
that  .  Now adjust   to fix   at  .  If  , then by Lemma 4 
is unaltered by the adjustment in  .  If instead  , then   may be altered by45
the adjustment in  , and the impact on   of the described adjustments in   and   is then
ambiguous: generically, however, these adjustments do not leave   unaltered; therefore, by
choosing the direction of the original change in  , we may (generically) find an adjustment in 
and   that strictly lowers   and fixes   at  , thereby assuring that B will accept this
alternative proposal.  Next, by combining the implied adjustment in   with adjustments in the
stage-2 proposals for  ,   and   that fix the levels of   and   at   and   respectively,
and maintain  , the efficiency conditions (4) and (6) imply that there can be no (first-order)
effect of these combined adjustments on  .  But with    under this adjusted
proposal, A can then reduce the level of   it proposes in stage-2 and enjoy a strict welfare benefit
from this maneuver.  (B) If  , then reduce the proposed   slightly; this leads to
a strict reduction in   by  Lemma 4 if   and by (A4) if instead
, thereby ensuring that  .  Now adjust   to fix   at  .  If
, then by Lemma 4   is unaltered by the adjustment in  .  If instead
, then   may be altered by the adjustment in  , and the impact on   of
the described adjustments in   and   is then ambiguous: generically, however, these adjustments
do not leave   unaltered; therefore, by choosing the direction of the original change in  , we
may (generically) find an adjustment in   and   that strictly lowers   and fixes   at  ,
thereby assuring that B will accept this alternative proposal. Next, by combining the implied
adjustments in   and   with adjustments in the stage-2 proposals for  ,   and   that fix the
levels of   and   at   and   respectively, and maintain  , the efficiency conditions
(4), (5) and (6) imply that there can be no (first-order) effect of these combined adjustments on  .
But with    under this adjusted proposal, A can then reduce the level of   it proposes
in stage-2 and enjoy a strict welfare benefit from this maneuver.  (II) Suppose   and
.  Feasibility then implies by Lemma 5 that   and
. Choose a small adjustment in   to   and   to   that
solves   for    while  maintaining
.  Generically, such an adjustment exists, and for a sufficiently small
adjustment we have as well that   is consistent with (A1)-(A2) for   and  .  By the first-
order condition that defines  , a small adjustment in   and   has no (first-order) impact on46
, and so we also have  .  Therefore, by Lemma 5, it is
(generically) feasible for A to efficiently deliver   to B and   to C whenever it is
feasible for A to efficiently deliver   to B and   to C, and so A would never choose
the latter. QED
Lemma 7: Under (A5), there does not exist a SGPE of the Secure-Contract Game in which the
outcome is (generically) efficient and violates (11).
Proof: In the text we established that, if there exists a   that satisfies the conditions of Lemma
5 for some   and   and that, in addition, violates (11), then  and (generically)
.  Consider, then, a small reduction in  .  Observe that with (11) violated, both   and 
are differentiable in  , and under (A5) a small reduction in   will (generically) alter both 
and  , leading to four possible cases.  (I)   and   are reduced.  Then adjust   and 
to keep   and   unchanged (and note that   and   are independent of   and   and,
with (11) violated, independent as well of any change in   that may be required to maintain
).  By efficiency condition (4), these adjustments create a second-order reduction in  , and
 while  .  A can then reduce   while keeping 
and enjoy a strict gain from this maneuver.  (II)   and   are increased. Then reverse the
change in  , i.e., increase  , and this will reduce both   and  . Then proceed as in (I).  (III)
 is increased while   is reduced.   First adjust   and   to keep   and   unchanged.
By efficiency condition (4), these adjustments create a second-order reduction in  , and
 while  .  Then adjust  ,   and   to set 
and    (and note that   and    are unaffected by these further adjustments and, with
(11) violated, independent as well of any change in   that may be required to maintain  ).
Together, these adjustments (generically) alter  .  If   rises, then we have found a set of
adjustments under which A gains.  If   falls, then reverse the change in  , i.e., increase  , and
reverse the sign of all the described adjustments, and   must then rise under these reversed
adjustments.  (IV)   is reduced while   is increased.  First adjust   and   to keep   and 
unchanged.  By efficiency condition (4), these adjustments create a second-order reduction in  ,
and   while  .  Then adjust  ,   and   to set 47
and   (and note that   and    are unaffected by these further adjustments and, with
(11) violated, independent as well of any change in   that may be required to maintain  ).
Together, these adjustments (generically) alter  .  If   rises, then we have found a set of
adjustments under which A gains.  If   falls, then reverse the change in  , i.e., increase  , and
reverse the sign of all the described adjustments, and  must then rise under these reversed
adjustments.  With these four cases, we have therefore established that, if there exists a   that
satisfies the conditions of Lemma 5 for some   and   and that, in addition, violates (11), then
A can (generically) find a better proposal.  Hence, there does not exist a SGPE of the Secure-
Contract Game in which the outcome is (generically) efficient and violates (11). QED
Lemma 8 : Under (A6), it is feasible in the Contract Renegotiation Game to efficiently deliver
 and   if and only if there exists   with   and 
consistent with (A1)-(A2) for   and   such that 
(14a) , and
(14b) .
The implied stage-1 proposal is then  .
Proof: If the conditions of the Lemma are satisfied, then a stage-1 proposal of
 will be followed by a stage-2 proposal of  , 
and   , and each proposal will be accepted, delivering   and   efficiently.  Given
this stage-1 proposal, A can do no better for itself with an alternative stage-2 proposal, since that
would require that either B get less than  , which would violate the security constraint, or that C
get less than  , which C would not accept.  Going the other way, if (14a) is violated, then the
security constraint and   imply that  , but then
by Lemma 3 backward stealing in stage 2 would preclude efficiency.  If (14b) is violated, then either
, but then A could increase its welfare by deviating from the efficient policies to propose
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